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1       Introduction 
 
The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is a complex distributed system-
of-systems (SoS) composed of sensors, weapons, C2BMC software, and other compo-
nents, some of which are non-developmental or even non-organic to the BMDS. 
Engineering of the BMDS requires one to take a holistic approach that includes the physi-
cal modeling and analysis of the missile defense operating environment, development of 
metrics and techniques to analyze the communication requirements of the net-centric 
Ballistic Missile Defense warfare, and the use of architectural patterns and other software 
technologies to shape the emergent behavior of the BMDS taking into account of the sys-
tem’s interoperability, composability, extensibility, and dynamic reconfigurability..  
This report summarizes the work in FY07 to investigate new technologies to sup-
port the development of the BMDS. The research was conducted by nine faculty, three 
doctoral students, five master’s students, and four summer interns at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). We developed new scoring functions for the fusion of sensor 
data, an algorithm for multiple hypothesis tracking, a distributed medium access control 
protocol and data dissemination algorithm for wireless networks of cooperative radar 
systems, simulation models for network-centric electronic warfare metrics study and for 
the prediction of the over the horizon radar system footprints, technologies for the correct 
specification and validation of temporal behaviors in a Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) based SoS, runtime verification of system-level requirements of distributed reac-
tive systems using MSC-Assertions, and safety assurance of reconfigurable and self-re-
configurable systems. We also evaluated the effectiveness of the real-time Java technol-
ogy for BMDS software, and the potential impact of integrating the Air Force YAL-1A 
Attack Laser into the BMDS.  
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the software technologies 
for the safety assurances of reconfigurable systems. Section 3 presents a new formalism, 
called the Message Sequence Chart (MSC) assertion, for specifying temporal behavior in 
systems-of-systems (SoSes) and the validation and enforcement of these assertions via 
runtime execution monitoring. Section 4 describes the integration of discrete event 
simulation and runtime execution monitoring of the MSC assertions to verify distributed 
protocols. Section 5 describes our study on the effectiveness of the real-time Java for the 
BMDS. Sections 6 presents a scoring function for the fusion of sensor data. Section 7 
presents a comparison of hyperbolic and Kalman techniques for tracking a ballistic 
missile and determining the launch site. Section 8 describes an improved multiple 
hypothesis tracking algorithm for tracking multiple ballistic missiles, and Section 9 
presents a distributed medium access control protocol and data dissemination algorithm 
for wireless networks of cooperative radar systems. Section 10 describes the simulation 
models for network centric EW metrics study and for the prediction of the over the 
horizon radar system footprints, and Section 11 discusses the potential impact of 
integrating the Air Force YAL-1A Attack Laser into the BMDS. Section 12 finishes the 
report with concluding remarks and a discussion of future work. 
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2       Safety Assurances of Reconfigurable Systems [1] 
 
This research is concerned with the safety assurance of reconfigurable and self-
reconfigurable systems. A part of the BMDS is the Global Integrated Fire Control System 
(GIFC) which works as a globally distributed real-time, software-intensive, and safety-
critical battle management system. The design of the GIFC provides the capability for the 
BMDS to dynamically reconfigure itself, in addition to providing for the evolution of the 
system through the plug-and-play of components and subsystems. The GIFC system must 
meet the following reconfigurability and self-reconfigurability requirements: 
 
(1) The network of GIFC nodes must be dynamically reconfigurable into any hierarchical 
structure to support the evolving C2 structures for Ballistic Missile Defense; 
 
(2) The assets (sensors and weapons) assigned to each GIFC node must be dynamically 
reconfigurable to cope with the changing workload of the BMDS;  
 
(3) The GIFC system must be self-reconfigurable so that when one GIFC node is out of 
order, its workload and resources (e.g., sensors, weapons, etc.) will be dynamically and 
automatically re-distributed to other GIFC nodes.  
 
 
2.1      Safety Requirements of the GIFC 
 
Following the Missile Defense Agency’s capability-based acquisition process for 
development of the GIFC, we started by developing high-level Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) use cases and then refining these use cases into successively lower 
level use cases and other UML artifacts (e.g., statecharts). The use cases focus our atten-
tion on the “why” and “what” of the system instead of the “how;” that is, use cases are 
supposed to be implementation-neutral. In conjunction with the Missile Defense National 
Team (MDNT), we conducted preliminary hazard analyses (PHA) using the UML arti-
facts as our reference. An example of a hazard we identified from conducting PHA is in-
advertent release of weapons. As we identified hazards, we specified safety requirements 
to address the hazards and recorded those requirements in the safety requirements trace-
ability matrix (SRTM). For those safety requirements that are allocated to software, we 
record those requirements in the software SRTM (SSRTM). These matrixes are used to 
trace safety requirements to system hazards and all of the other system artifacts, in sup-
port of developing the safety case (i.e., a claim about the level of safety afforded by the 
system, arguments supporting the claim, and documentation backing up the arguments) 
for the BMDS that the GIFC poses a tolerable level of safety risk. As the software engi-
neers refine the safety and other system requirements into designs, the safety engineers 
apply safety analysis techniques such as Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) to identify potential failure modes, assess the risk associated with those failure 
modes, to rank the issues in terms of importance and to identify and carry out corrective 
actions to address the most serious concerns. An example of a causal factor we identified 
 3
is an error in the weapon-assignment processing that causes one or more erroneous 
weapons-tasking-order messages to be sent to engagement data stores. 
 
 
2.2       Safety Assurance of the GIFC 
 
  We present four techniques in this section to help assure the safety properties of 
the GIFC at runtime. 
 
 
2.2.1 Safety Assertions  
 
Studies have suggested that the process of specifying requirements formally en-
ables developers to gain a deeper understanding of the system being specified, and to un-
cover requirements flaws, inconsistencies, ambiguities and incompletenesses. Formal 
specification is key to test automation and run-time error detection and recovery of com-
plex systems. Moreover, the narrower the syntactic and semantic gaps between the mod-
els of requirements and design, the more likely the system designers will understand the 
requirements accurately and build the systems correctly. Figure 1 shows an example of a 
statechart assertion to assure that GIFC’s track processor’s workload remains below 75% 
of it maximum capacity as mush as possible in order to prevent any “erroneous weapon 
system tasking” fault that may be caused by the unexpected delay in GIFC’s sensor track 
classification. 
 
Figure 1: Statechart assertion example 
 
The statechart assertion is written from the point of view of an observer; when-
ever the statechart assertion observes that the Track Processor receives a putTrack event 
or a getTrack event, it updates its variable cnt and checks to see if the temporal assertion 
has been triggered. It uses two timers, oneMinuteTimer and tenMinuteTimer, to keep 
track of the temporal conditions of the track processor’s workload and will enter the 
Error state if the temporal assertion has been violated.  
Most system designers will find the above statechart assertion much more easily 
understandable than the following equivalent text-based assertion:   
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Always (cnt > 0.75 * MaxCount Implies 
   (Eventually <=1 min (Always <=10 min cnt <= 0.5 * MaxCount))) 
 
 
2.2.2 Run-time Monitoring of Safety Assertions 
 
 Runtime Execution Monitoring (REM) is a class of methods for tracking the 
temporal behavior of an underlying application. REM methods range from simple print 
statement logging methods to run-time tracking of complete formal requirements for veri-
fication purposes. Due to the dynamic nature of the BMDS system verification of indi-
vidual components alone can never give us the kind of assurance one expects to have for 
the safety-critical BMDS. To increase the robustness of the BMDS we need to armor-
plate it against unexpected behaviors. One form of armor-plating is to fortify the soft-
ware’s exception-handling ability via runtime monitoring of temporal assertions, where 
formal specifications are translated by a code generator into C, C++, or Java statements 
to be deployed for catching exceptions in the final product during runtime. 
 
 
2.2.3 Safety Wrappers  
 
The “erroneous weapon system tasking” fault can also be caused by errors due to 
the dynamic reconfigurable nature of the BMDS. Figure 2 shows a UML-RT model of the 
high-level architecture of a BMDS, which is made up of a set of GIFC capsules, a set of 
Weapon_System capsules and a set of Sensor capsules (as indicated by the multi-object 
icons).  In case a fault occurs, the safety wrappers will help detect and isolate the errors 
traceable to the fault. 
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Figure 2: The high-level architecture of a BMDS 
 
 
2.2.4 Safety Kernels 
 
A safety kernel is a software component of a safety-critical system specifically 
designed to reduce the probability of occurrence of mishaps. It provides a centralized 
point for safety processing: the detection, tolerance and isolation of faults that may result 
in safety hazards.  The safety kernel architecture varies from the simple watchdog safety 
kernel at one end of the spectrum to the dual and multiple redundant safety kernels in the 
other end of the spectrum. The safety executive is an example of the safety kernel archi-
tectures that lie within the middle of the spectrum. The safety executive typically moni-
tors the operation of a system for the following inputs: (1) watchdogs timeouts, (2) ex-
ceptions raised by safety-assertion run-time monitors and safety wrappers, and (3) faults 
from continuous or periodic built-in-tests, and will attempt to recover from the faults by 
resetting the processes or re-configuring the system via the fail-safe channels, or bring the 




3 Service-Oriented Architecture Based System-of-
Systems [2] 
 
 Large SoSes are typically made up of a federation of existing systems and 
developing systems interacting with each other over a network to provide an enhanced 
capability greater than that of any of the individual systems within the system-of-systems. 
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) and the supporting Web Services (WS) technology 
hold promise to create SoSes that are interoperable, composable, extensible, and dynami-
cally reconfigurable. A Web Service has two components: a contract defining its external 
behavior from the clients’ point of view, and a business process describing its internal 
logic via the coordination and composition of other Web Services. The specification of 
these complex business processes is error prone due to concurrency in activities execu-
tion, possibility of communication delay and error, as well as faults in the remote service 
providers. Using light-weight formal methods consisting of the following four steps it is 
possible to enhance the trustworthiness of the Web Services: 
 
(1) Specify the business process in some semi-formal languages (e.g., the Business 
Processing Execution Language (BPEL)); 
 
(2) Translate the specifications into formal models (e.g., linear temporal logic, state ma-
chines, Petri nets, process algebras); 
 
(3) Specify the desirable functional and non-functional properties of the business process 
as formal assertions; 
 
(4) Verify the formal business process models against the properties by proving theo-
rems, model checking, or specification-based testing. 
 
However, for the aforementioned methods to effectively produce trustworthy SoSes, we 
need to first validate the accuracy and the correctness of the formal-assertion representa-
tion of the mission-essential and safety-critical properties of the SoSes and second verify 
the business process models against these properties. 
 
 
3.1      Message Sequence Chart Assertions 
  
 MSC Assertions are a formal-language extension of UML Message Sequence 
Charts (MSC’s) superimposed with UML statecharts. MSC Assertions are based on 
Statechart diagrams superimposed on MSC diagrams and augmented with Java (or C++) 
conditions and actions. For example, Figure  3 shows the MSC Assertion for a time-
bound requirement of a travel agent service: “R1: The travel agent must obtain bids from 
at least two airlines and two hotels and return a flight and a hotel matching the cus-
tomer’s request within 30 seconds from the time the customer issues his travel request.” 
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Figure 3: A MSC assertion for the travel agent service 
 
 
3.2      Validation and Execution Monitoring of MSC Assertions  
 
It is important to validate the correctness of the assertions early in the software-
development process. Unfortunately, users often discover, late in the development proc-
ess, that their assertions are incorrect and do not work as intended. Our methodology is 
that requirements be simulated to assure that the cognitive understanding of the require-
ment matches the formal specification. To that end, we developed a run-time monitor for 
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MSC Assertions that is fully integrated with the popular JUnit testing framework and 
created a set of scenarios, using the JUnit testing framework. 
Due to the possibility of communication delay and error, as well as faults that 
may occur during a remote procedure call, verification alone cannot assure the overall 
level of trustworthiness required of the SOA-based SoSes for BMD applications. To in-
crease the robustness of the system by protecting against unexpected behaviors we can 
use runtime monitoring of temporal assertions. 
 
 
4       Verifying Distributed Protocols [3] 
 
The design and implementation of reliable applications on top of asynchronous 
distributed systems that are prone to processor and network crashes is a difficult and 
complex task. A distributed system is made up of several components, executing concur-
rently and interacting with each other under the control of specialized procedures called 
protocols. Often, distributed-system protocols are correct for an ideal system but do not 
operate as well in a less than ideal situation. This research addresses the problem using 
Runtime Execution Monitoring (REM) based techniques. We build upon our previous 
work on state-chart-assertions and REM of intra-agent behavior. Unlike the other ap-
proaches, MSC-Assertions, being a natural extension of the statechart assertions, provide 
a unified model for both intra- and inter-agent behavior specification, thus eliminating the 
need to translate and maintain two models (one for intra-agent and the other for inter-
agent) when designing and analyzing distributed system behaviors. We demonstrate the 
technique with a proof-of-concept prototype for assessing the failure rate of a time-bound 
formal requirement for a distributed-system protocol (leader election) operating with non-
ideal communication links. The proof-of-concept prototype is as follows: 
 
(1) An OMNeT++ model of a 4-node ring network with parameterized network delays, 
 
(2) A UML statechart model and generated code for the network agents, 
 
(3) A MSC-Assertion for the timely election of a leader and the validation of the asser-
tion via simulation, and 
 
(4) A large set of test scenarios for the 4-node ring distributed system, using white-box 
test generation techniques.  
 
 
4.1      OMNeT++ and UML Models 
 
OMNeT++, which stands for Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++, is an 
object-oriented discrete event simulator primarily designed for the simulation of commu-
nication protocols, communication networks and traffic models, and multi-processors and 
distributed systems models. Figure  4 shows a simple OMNeT++ model of a four-node 




Figure 4: A 4-node ring network model in OMNeT++ 
 
Figure 5 shows the top-level statechart of a leader election (LE) module. The top-level 
statechart consists of four states, the Initializing state and three composite states named 
DoingSomething, Electing_Leader and Found_Leader, together with a set of state vari-
















































[nStart < START_THRESHOLD] /
agent->send_election(Own_Id);
 
Figure 5: Top level page of LE statechart 
 
 Figure 6 shows a MSC-Assertion for the the following requirement of the 4-node 
ring: “All agents contain the same ID for the elected leader, which is the largest identity 
value among the ID’s of all the active LE modules in the network, in at most 60 seconds 
after the first election event detected in the network”. 
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Figure 6: A time-bound leader-election MSC-Assertion for a 4 ring network 
 
 
4.2      System-Level Simulation and Scenario Generation 
  
In order to assure that there is a cognitive understanding of that the formal 
specification match the requirements we required a simulation. Automatic scenario 
generation was constructed using the component level White-Box Automatic Test 
Generator (WBATG) described in [4] generates a JUnit test suite that repeatedly 
exercises the component under test using events, time, and data information specified in 
the component. 
 The likelihood of success of the leader-election requirement was calculated as the 
ratio of relevant test scenarios for which the MSC-assertion succeeded to the overall 
number of relevant tests. With the help of OMNeT++, we can now simulate different 




Figure 7: The OMNeT++ model augmented with run-time execution  
monitor and white-Box Tester 
 
 
5       Experiments with Real-Time Java[5] 
 
There is an increasing interest in recent years to use the JavaTM programming lan-
guage for implementing real-time systems. Recent advances in the Real-Time 
Specification for Java (RTSJ) have resulted in the introduction of new means for creating 
predictable real-time environments for Java programs. However, these new features also 
make the Java semantics more complex and the run-time behavior of the Java programs 
more difficult to analyze. In a prior study [6], we concluded that it is preferable to use 
only the Real-Time Java threads that use the heap memory and not the no-heap real-time 
threads for the GIFC software, due to the difficulties in writing correct Java programs 
using the no-heap real-time threads by the majority of the Java programmers in the 
BMDS project. We proposed a real-time design pattern for a class of real-time applica-
tions that allows developers to use (and re-use) Java code libraries and components that 
use the heap in time-constrained applications. However, the proposed design pattern 
cannot be implemented by using Sun Java Real-Time System (RTS) 1.0. In FY07, we 
conducted further experiments to determine if the preferred architecture can be 
implemented with the Sun Java RTS 2.0, which will give programmers more control over 
the priority of the garbage collection. The beta version was released in December, 2006 
and it supports RTGC. We performed experiments to explore viable software 
architectures for the GIFC software.  
 Our experiments indicated that critical improvements made in the beta version did 
meet our software requirements. In order to run the RTS 2.0 beta version, we are required 
to update our Solaris machine. The hardware is SunBlade 2500. The operating system is 




5.1      RTS v2.0 Real-Time Garbage Collector 
 
 The real-time garbage collector (RTGC) provided in Sun Java RTS 2.0 has made 
critical improvements over the previous versions. It is now fully concurrent, and it can be 
preempted by the application’s real-time threads with a higher priority. By properly 
tuning the values for two runtime parameters—RTGCCriticalPriority and 
RTGCCriticalReservedBytes—we will be able to achieve the desired balance of 
deterministic behavior of the critical threads and an overall throughput of the application. 
 The parameter RTGCCriticalReservedBytes reserves the amount of critical 
memory. If the amount of free memory becomes lower than 
RTGCCriticalReservedBytes, the priority of RTGC is increased to RTGCCriticalPriority. 
This prevents all other threads (non-time-critical real-time threads and non-real-time 
threads) from allocating CPU cycles and memory, and causes them to be blocked. Only 
critical real-time threads will continue to run. It is important to set the 
RTGCCriticalReservedBytes high enough to prevent a lack of free memory to run critical 
threads but not too high to prevent lower priority threads from running and causing a 
drop in throughput. 
 
 
5.2      Experiments with RTS2.0 
 
 In this section, we describe the seven experiments performed with Java RTJ 2.0 
beta release, with the RTGCCriticalReservedBytes set to 0. We set the 
RTGCCriticalReservedByte value to 0 so we can investigate the ideal configuration for 
the GIFC that achieves the maximum throughput. The new RTGC performed in a satis-
factory manner and has met our expectations. 
 
 
5.2.1 Experiments 1 to 4 
 
 These experiments were performed with Java RTS 1.0, and we described our 
findings in our previous technical report [6]. We ran them again using Java RTS 2.0 and 
did not observe any anomaly. In Experiment 1, a real-time thread, with the highest possi-
ble priority, creates a linked list of nodes. We confirmed that this thread does get pre-
empted even if its priority is higher than the one for RTGC when the available memory is 
exhausted. Experiments No. 2 and No. 3 used NoHeapRealtimeThread objects, and as 
such, they are somewhat moot under RTS 2.0 since our recommended software architec-
ture does not use no-heap real-time threads. In Experiment No. 4, we used only regular 
real-time threads (i.e., instances of the RealtimeThread class) dividing them into nominal 
and stateless discriminators (see Figure 8). If a stateless discriminator can finish its task 
within the designated deadline, the actual result is reported. If it cannot finish its task 
within the deadline, a default value (called the nominal result) is reported. We observed 




Figure 8. Sequence diagram for experiment 4  
 
 
5.2.2 Experiment 5 - Interaction between RTGC and Real-Time Threads 
 
The purpose of this experiment is to check the thread priority relationship be-
tween the real-time threads (instances of RealTimeThread and its subclasses) and the 
real-time garbage collector (RTGC). We define a descendant of RealtimeThread named 
RTGC_Tester. A RTGC_Tester simulates real-time computation by creating a linked list 
of N nodes with each node having an array of 500 BigInteger objects. By varying the 
values for N, we can study the impact of the real-time garbage collector to the running 
program when the garbage collection kicks in. The main driver creates and runs a number 
(M) of RTGC_Tester objects, where the value for M is an input to the program. 
RTGC_Tester objects are executed in sequence, and we track the elapsed time of each 
object in completing its execution. As more and more RTGC_Tester objects are executed, 
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memory is consumed, and depending of the values of M and N, garbage collection would 
take place. We want to see how the real-time garbage collection would affect the 
execution of RTGC_Tester objects. We ran the test driver in two ways. In the first way, 
we set the priority of RTGC_Tester objects to the highest value and in the second way we 
set their priority to the lowest value. When there is no more free memory, the garbage 
collector will preempt any real-time thread (regardless of their priority) to reclaim 
memory from discarded RTGC_Tester objects. We observed this behavior in our test 
runs. The priority assigned to the RTGC_Tester objects is irrelevant when the free 
memory is exhausted. Results of the experiment with max priority and min priority 
RTGC tester are displayed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Notice Tables 1 and 2 display 
similar results. 
 
Table 1: Experiment 5 Test Results with Max priority RTGC Tester 
M (repeat 
count) 












100 0 0 -- Elapsed time for the 
uninterrupeted 
RTGC_Tester is 
approximately 3 ms. 
200 1 1 143 ms  
300 1 1 144 ms  













Table 2: Experiment 5 Test Results with Min priority RTGC Tester 
M (repeat 
count) 












100 0 0 -- Elapsed time for the 
uninterrupeted 
RTGC_Tester is 
approximately 3 ms. 
200 1 1 144 ms  
300 1 1 144 ms  













5.2.3 Experiment 6 - Mixture of Critical and Non-Critical Real-Time Threads 
 
In this experiment, we test a more realistic configuration where a mixture of 
critical and non-critical threads coexist in a running program. This configuration is closer 
to our proposed architecture of using high-priority Nominal and low-priority Stateless 
discriminators. For this experiment, we define two real-time thread classes: 
RTGC_Nominal and RTGC_Stateless. An instance of the RTGC_Nominal class 
simulates a Nominal object by spending time doing computation without allocating any 
memory in heap (uses only a local variable). An instance of the RTGC_Stateless class 
simulates a Stateless object by allocating a linked list of 2000 nodes with each node 
holding 500 BigInteger objects. 
The main class of the experiment will create N RTGC_Nominal and N 
RTGC_Stateless threads in the initialization phase (where N is an input to the program) 
and then run the 2N threads concurrently. The RTGC_Nominal threads are run in the 
highest priority and the RTGC_Stateless in the lowest real-time thread priority. The 
priority of the RTGC is set to 40 as a runtime option. For each thread, we track its 
elapsed time.  
Because the RTGC_Stateless threads allocate heap memory, we expect them to be 
interrupted and paused to wait for the garbage collector to complete its work, while the 
RTGC_Nominal threads sees no interruptions. The test runs confirmed our expectation. 
Table 3 shows some of the test results. 
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No of times 
GC 
occurred 
Minimum and Maximum 
elapsed times of 
RTGC_Nominal threads 
Minimum and Maximum 
elapsed times of 
RTGC_Stateless Threads 










































5.2.4 Experiment 7 - Modified Experiment 4 
 
In Experiment No 4, we used a deadline miss handler to process the timeout 
situation in which the DiscriminatorStateless is not able to compute the result within the 
allocated time period (see Figure 8). Because the deadline miss handler is associated to 
the DiscriminatorStateless that has a priority lower than the one for the RTGC, there is a 
possibillity of RTGC interrupting/delaying the asyncronous transfer of control to the 
deadline miss handler. To avoid this undesirable possibility, we used an alternative archi-
tecture to associate the deadline miss handler to a higher priority DiscriminatorNominal.  
The alternative architecture uses a timer, specifically, a OneShotTimer, to monitor the 
deadline for the stateless method. We designate the deadline to this OneShotTimer object 
by specifying a RelativeTime, such as 20 ms. When the set time is up, the OneShotTimer 
will trigger an event that allows the deadline handler to process the missed deadline. 
We divide real-time threads into the two groups: those with a priority higher and 
those lower than the one for the RTGC. We call them the critical and noncritical threads, 
respectively. The key aspect of this architecture is that only the noncritical threads 
allocate memory in the heap. In our particular case, only the Stateless instances will 
allocate the heap memory. This architecture ensures that the critical threads will not get 















      Figure 9: Collaboration diagram of the revised design 
  
 SimulatorControl is a RealtimeThread and its run method is defined as follows: 
 
 public void run( ) { 
 
for (int i = 0; i < N; i++) { 
  Track node = new Track(i); 
  DiscriminatorNominal disc  
   = new DiscriminatorNominal(this, node); 
  nominal[i] = disc; 
  dicriminatorCnt++; 
 }  
 
 for (int i = 0; i < N) { 
  nominal[i].start(); 
  /* A */ 




 At Point A in the code, after a nominal discriminator is started, we can place a 
time delay. Placing no delay means the program will run all nominal discriminators si-
multaneously. This could lead to an OutOfMemory exception when N becomes larger 
than a certain threshold. If we place certain amount of delay at Point A in the code, then it 
becomes possible for the nominal discriminators to complete its computation and call the 
SimulatorControl’s workDone() method to turn themselves and memory allocated by the 
corresponding stateless discriminators into garbage for the RTGC to collect.  A 
DiscriminatorNominal object performs the discrimination operation on a given track 
while a DiscriminatorStateless does the actual work of discrimination by interacting with 
its associated Track object. When the time duration set for the OneShotTimer is up, it 
calls its controlling DiscriminatorNominal to report that the nominal result must be used. 
 Table 4 summarizes the tests we ran using a varying number of discriminators, 
deadlines, and the pause time between the creation of discriminators (at point A in the 
code). The first tests used no delays (delay time = 0), the second had a 5 ms delay 
between the creation of discriminators and the third used 50 ms between the creation of 
discriminators.  
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Result with no delay
(# of timeouts) 
Result with 5ms 
delay 
(# of timeouts) 
Result with 50ms 
delay 
(# of timeouts) 
20 100 79 ~ 100 0 0 
 200 200 0 0 
 500 500 0 0 
 1000 1000 0 0 
 1500 OutOfMemory OutOfMemory 1 ~ 5 (1 GC) 
50 100 28 ~ 96 0 0 
 200 142 ~ 200 0 0 
 500 500 0 0 
 1000 1000 0 0 
 1500 OutOfMemory OutOfMemory 0 (1 GC) 
100 100 0 ~ 60 0 0 
 200 35 ~ 200 0 0 
 500 500 0 0 
 1000 1000 0 0 
 1500 OutOfMemory OutOfMemory 0 (1 GC) 
500 100 0 0 0 
 200 0 0 0 
 500 184 ~ 434 0 0 
 1000 998 ~ 1000 0 0 
 1500 OutOfMemory OutOfMemory 0 (1 GC) 
 
While increasing the deadline of the discriminators gives them more time to complete 
their computation and decreases the number of timeouts, we get an OutOfMemory ex-
ception for all values of deadlines when the number of discriminators, N is set to 1500 
and no delay is used between discriminators. Even when we increased the delay time to 5 
ms, we still get an OutOfMemory exception regardless of the values for the deadline 
when N = 1500, indicating that a 5 ms delay time is not long enough for the run method 
to be interrupted and the nominal discriminator to get a chance to call the workDone 
method. If we set the delay time to 50 ms we see that there is enough time for the RTGC 




6       Data Fusion and Tracking 
 
A data fusion problem where a number of different types of sensors are deployed 
in the vicinity of a ballistic missile launch is studied [7]. An objective of this work is to 
calculate a scoring function for each sensor track, and the track file with the best (opti-
mum) track score can then be used for guiding an interceptor to the threat within the 
boost phase. Seven active ground-based radars, two space-based passive infrared sensors 
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and two active light detection and ranging (LIDAR) sensors are used to track the ballistic 
missile in the boost phase. Each space-based platform carries one passive infrared sensor 
and one LIDAR.  
For the threat scenario, an IMPULSE© intercontinental ballistic missile model is 
used to create the trajectory of a generic ballistic threat. The IMPULSE model is devel-
oped by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center to provide an accurate represen-
tation of ballistic missiles [8]. Each sensor provides a track of the missile in the boost 
phase by using a multiple hypotheses tracking algorithm with an extended Kalman filter. 
The calculation of the track scoring function is to identify the sensor with the best track 
file. A track score is calculated for each sensor based on the kinematics of the missile 
flight parameters and the signal-to-noise ratio at the sensor. By using likelihood ratios, 
the optimum track file of the threat can then be determined and the corresponding track 
file can be transmitted to the battle manager control in order to lead the interceptor vehi-
cle against the threat using the track file with the best score. Using the optimum track file 
scoring signal processing techniques developed in this work, the best track file can be 
sent to the interceptor to destroy the ballistic threat. This leads to a faster response man-
agement where the threat can be destroyed inside the territory of the country which 
launched the threat before any countermeasures are deployed. 
The main goal was the evaluation of the performance of these sensors during the 
boost-phase stage of the missile’s flight. The SNR of the sensors is used as a figure of 
merit.  Seven X-band, ground based radars with the same parameters are deployed at dif-
ferent positions. Observing the results of the radars, it is inferred that the distance be-
tween the radar and the target is the basic factor to be taken into account for evaluating 
the performance of the sensor in the data fusion process. Two IR sensors are deployed in 
two LEO satellites in order to evaluate their performance during boost-phase. They have 
an advantage over radars due to their capability to detect the radiation of the missile in 
this phase. Two LIDAR sensors are also deployed on the same platforms along with the 
IR sensors. The LIDAR sensor is used to provide the third dimension, the range, which 
an IR sensor cannot calculate. Based on the results, it is inferred that the use of the LEO 
satellite supported by IR sensors improves the detection and tracking performance of a 
ballistic target in the first stage of its flight. The drawback is that the area covered by a 
LEO satellite for surveillance is limited, so a network of LEO satellites is required for 
covering the Earth. The next goal of the work was the fusion of the radar sensor data. The 
technique of likelihood ratios for tracking of each sensor is used. The evaluation provides 
results about the performance of each sensor with respect to the scan number, which in 
this work represents the time of the flight.  
 
 
7       Ballistic Missile Simulation and Tracking 
 
This research extends the tracking and backfitting techniques used earlier by the 
Naval Postgraduate School [9-13] and compares Kalman-based and particle filter-based 
algorithms with hyperbolic backfit formulas and genetic algorithms. The IMM filter in-
troduced here dates back to work by Blom [14], and it has been modified and adapted for 
tracking by Blom, Bar-Shalom and others [15][16]. 
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Using three dimensional measurements (range, azimuth and elevation) available 
to the tracking algorithms we created a simulation for the trajectory of a ballistic missile. 
The missile was modeled to have an 8 g acceleration equivalent thrust. Gravity 
acceleration was assumed to be constant and atmospheric drag used an exponential model 
for atmospheric attenuation with altitude[17]. The acceleration vector used in the missile 
simulation was: 
 
 2)(001.0 vzTa ××−= σ                
 
where  )(zσ   is the height-dependent atmospheric density, v  is the missile speed,  and 
T is the thrust. This acceleration vector is implemented in the direction of the velocity 
vector to emulate a gravity turn.  
 
 
Figure 10: Ballistic missile trajectory 
 
The missile was launched at a vertical angle of 87.5 degrees and performed a 
gravity turn in the (x,z) plane, z being altitude.  The launch point (x,y,z) was (-30000, 
40000, 0) and the sensor was at (0,0,0).  No noise was added to the simulated missile dy-
namics.  Measurement errors were taken as 10 meters standard deviation in range, 0.7 
degree in azimuth, and 0.7 degree in elevation.  Measurements were mapped into 
Cartesian coordinates, and the measurement equation was assumed linear in both the 
Kalman and the particle filter.  Measurements were assumed to occur every 0.1 second. 
 
 















7.1      Results of Simulation Comparison 
 
The results of the simulation demonstrated that the IMM performance is superior 






Figure 11: Mean distance errors: IMM and KF acc track comparison 
 
 Further simulations of the Kalman backfit estimate for launch point determination 
demonstrated a bias. Depicted in Figure 12 is the 95% error ellipse generated by the 1000 
data point sample covariance. 
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Figure 12: Scatter plot of launch point estimates with 95% ellipse 
 
The inner error ellipse depicted in Figure 13 is a 95% error ellipse for the mean, 
and the mean of the data sample is at the center.  The actual launch point lies at the point 
depicted in the plot, noticeably outside the mean error ellipse, indicating this procedure 
tends to produce a biased estimate.  The error in the mean estimate is over 1.2 kilometers.  
The maximum distance from the sample mean to a point on the inner ellipse is approxi-
mately 600 meters.   
 
 
Figure 13: Confidence ellipse excluding true launch point 



















An analysis of individual simulations indicated that the largest source of error in 
the Kalman backfit algorithm occurred when the backfit trajectory did not reach the 
ground (indicating the error in the observations was leading to velocity estimates that 
were too small for the altitude at which the observations occurred). 
The Hyperbolic Backfit, designed to fit the observation data to a hyperbola with 
the origin on the ground, was found to run quite fast and have a better performance than 
the Kalman Backfit with the actual launch site inside the confidence region of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 14: Hyperbola launch point estimation mean 
 
A particle filter-based algorithm and a genetic algorithm for estimating missile 
launch point were also investigated using measurement data generated as described above 
for the Kalman and hyperbolic procedures.  The genetic algorithm produced results com-
parable to the Kalman backfit, but ran an order of magnitude slower.  The particle filter 
ran extremely slow, over three orders of magnitude slower than the Kalman and Hyper-
bolic backfit algorithms, with no discernible improvement in estimation error.  In fact, for 
the few cases completed, the results were worse than the Kalman backfit algorithm.  
From these results it appears that neither of these algorithms would be adequate for use in 
a real-time system. 
 
 
8       Multiple Hypothesis Tracking [18] 
 
 In this research, we investigate the use of the multiple hypotheses tracking (MHT) 
algorithm to process track files from a single sensor of a surface-based sensor network. In 
particular, a framework is developed for an efficient form of the MHT, specifically, the 


















linear assignment problem approach as developed in [19] is included and is used to 
quickly solve for the N-best association hypotheses and, thus, expediting the tracking 
process. This work applies the algorithm to the simulated multiple-ballistic missile launch 
as described above and examines the feasibility and appropriateness of the modified algo-
rithm for this specific application. More importantly, a study of the algorithm’s perform-
ance is made and we discuss its computational complexity in this particular setting. 
 
 
8.1      Functional Areas 
 
There are several functional areas considered in this work: the missile threat pro-
file, the sensor model, and the tracking algorithm. Figure 15 shows the main blocks con-
sidered throughout the remainder of this paper. The missile flight data is generated with 
the IMPULSE© simulation toolkit (left-most block). Realistic test data is generated to 




Figure 15: Main functional areas implemented in this study to include the 




8.1.1 Sensor Modeling 
 
The second key functional area in this work is the simulation of the radio fre-
quency (RF) sensor that is used to “detect” the missile launches and provide position 
measurement updates over time. An X-Band, low pulse repetition frequency (LPRF), 
monostatic radar is considered and is used to generate observations of the missile fly-out. 
The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the sensor is used to introduce precision error into the 










στλ=             
 
where tP is the peak transmitted power, G is the antenna gain, σ is the radar cross section 
of the object , τ is the compressed pulse width, λ is the wavelength, F is the noise factor, 
k is Boltzmann’s constant, 0T  is the system temperature, and R is the range to the target. 
The SNR quantity obtained from the above equation is used to calculate the range preci-












θσθ =    
 
where cB τ/1=  (or the inverse of the sub-pulse width), c is the speed of light, pn is the 
number of integrated pulses, dB3θ is the half-power beam-width, and 21 ≤≤ K  is an error-
slope coefficient. In this study, K assumed the value 1.7 for a monopulse radar.  
 
 
8.2  Multiple Hypothesis Tracking – Linear Assignment 
Approach 
  
In a multiple target environment, the primary difficulties correctly assigning suc-
cessive contacts to each corresponding established target’s next-state prediction. This 
process of making possible assignments is referred to as measurement-to-target associa-
tion. An association hypothesis maps each measurement to possible target next-state pre-
dictions. Furthermore, there may be hundreds of such potential hypotheses due to the un-
predictable nature of each target as they move in a multiple-target environment. Conse-
quently, the number of possible associations that must be examined is enormous. 
A critical drawback of the MHT, as developed by Reid and later modified by 
Nagarajan, Chidambara, and Sharma in [21], is its overall growth in computational 
requirements. As the number of targets in a scanning region increases, the number of 
measurement-to-known-targets hypotheses increases exponentially; thus, the standard 
approach to the MHT is not practical when processing power and memory are limited. A 
modification on the MHT, namely the inclusion of the linear assignment problem (LAP), 
provides an efficient means of identifying the likely measurement-to-target associations. 
The method for determining the association likelihood probability as outlined in [19] is 





8.3      Experimental Results 
 
The MHT with the LAP method was applied to the IMPULSE-generated ballistic 
missile launch scenario. Recall that IMPULSE© provides realistic motion modeling of 
missile flight as it incorporates many physical parameters when generating a flight pro-
file. The modeling tool enables the study to use missile data that exhibit staging—jetti-
soning of spent components—so we may study the success of the algorithm as the num-
ber of measurements increase. The staging events also present challenges for tracking al-
gorithm as the sudden loss of thrust and re-thrust at booster jettison introduces some 
nonlinear acceleration gradients. The acceleration profile and effect on the innovation can 
be seen in Figure 16. Despite the non-linear accelerations due to missile staging and in-
troduction of new targets—the spent booster cans—in the sensor’s view, the MHT is suc-
cessful in tracking each missile body. This can be seen in Figure 17(a). 
The algorithm also tracks each flight trajectory even though they may cross paths 
in the sensor’s view as seen in Figure 17(b). The viewpoint orientation is from behind the 
missile launch (missiles travel away from observer) and emphasize the tracking of cross-
ing flight trajectories. The tracking problem in this study examines at most 12 targets 
throughout the entire simulation, thus, for this experiment; there are 479 million potential 
hypotheses (M!) per time scan. However, the linear assignment problem is still computa-
tionally effective and efficient. The key advantage to linear assignment approach is that 







Figure 16:(a) Missile acceleration; peaks are indicative of staging. (b) 
Innovation, jmz ,~ , plot as reported by extended Kalman filter within the 









Figure 17: Missile trajectories as tracked by the MHT for (a) South-to-North 





9 Distributed Medium Access and Data Dissemination for 
Cooperative Radar Systems  
 
 In this section, we discuss research efforts that propose efficient and effective 
medium access and data dissemination schemes for a distrubted set of radars employed in 
BMDS.  Both of these algorithms view the wireless network of radars as a large-scale 
wireless sensor network and leverage ongoing research in sensor networks.   
  
 
9.1 CR-MAC:  A Distributed Medium Access Control Protocol for 
Wireless Networks of Cooperative Radar Systems [22] 
 
In this research, the medium access control issues of a distributed wireless 
network of cooperative tracking radars are investigated by modeling the individual radars 
as part of a system-of-systems rather than as independently operating sensors. Two 
fundamental observations are made regarding the radar control traffic flow and the radar 
data traffic flow: the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) is found to be bounded by the 
radar control packet delay and the radar data traffic is bursty but not well-suited to 
contention-based medium access. Motivated by these observations, we propose a novel 
medium access protocol: the Cooperative Radar Medium Access Control (CR-MAC) 
protocol. CR-MAC is an application-aware protocol that combines the throughput of a 
time division medium access (TDMA) protocol with reduced delay of a contention-based 
protocol. Control packet delay as well as data traffic throughput are analyzed and CR-
MAC is found to outperform conventional TDMA and CSMA. 
CR-MAC is a cross-layer, “application-aware” protocol that provides high data 
throughput through the use of a time division multiple access (TDMA)-based contention-
free architecture overlaid with a contention-based priority mechanism designed to ac-
commodate the delay-sensitive control packets. This protocol provides medium access 






















Figure 18: CR-MAC frame structure 
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We analyze the radar control packet delay as well as the data packet throughput 
and compare the performance of CR-MAC to conventional TDMA and CSMA schemes. 
Figures 19 and 20 show several results from the comparison. It can be seen that the 
throughput for CR-MAC does not fall off until PRF exceeds 100,000 pulses/sec. 
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Figure 21: Mean Control Packet Delay vs. PRF for CR-MAC, TDMA, and 802.11 
 
The performance of CR-MAC was compared to that of conventional TDMA and 
802.11 through simulation using OPNET (see Figure 21). As expected, CR-MAC is 
found to outperform TDMA by approximately an order of magnitude. This performance 
margin is proportional to the number of active nodes. The CMSA/CA scheme of 802.11 
performs well at low loads, but delay rapidly increases when the network becomes satu-




9.2   Data Dissemination Algorithm for a Hybrid Large-Scale 
Wireless Sensor Network [23] 
 
In this research, a hybrid, large-scale wireless sensor network (WSN) for missile 
defense is introduced that consists of terrestrial and satellite nodes. Rather than treating 
each node as an individual system, we model this sensor network as a system-of-systems 
with the objective of real-time tracking of multiple ballistic missile threats. We present a 
hybrid data dissemination algorithm based on a combination of data centric routing con-
cepts and clustering mechanisms. Through simulation, it is shown that the performance of 
this hybrid algorithm significantly improves data throughput without sacrificing the real-
time data delivery requirements associated with missile tracking applications.  
The terrestrial nodes will be both mobile and fixed RF and IR sensor platforms, 
such as land-based station, warships, fixed-wing aircraft, and unmanned air vehicles 
(UAV). The satellite sensor platforms will be Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) and Low 




Figure 22: Hybrid Wireless Sensor Network and Area of Interest (AOI) 
 
Considering the unique characteristic of a network designed to support missile de-
fense, we propose a data dissemination algorithm that combines the approach of data 
centric routing protocols with the use of a clustering mechanism called the “Area of In-
terest” (AOI) (see Figure 22). At any given point in time, this AOI will include a GEO 
satellite and the sensor nodes that are currently tracking the target (LEO satellite and/or 
terrestrial nodes). We model three major data flows in our network: (1) a flow among the 
sensor nodes that perform target tracking, (2) a backflow of target data traffic towards the 
sink, and (3) an engagement order flow from the sink to the weapon platforms involved 
in the target interception. For the backflow to the sink, we introduce data aggregation 




Figure 23: Flowchart of the proposed data dissemination algorithm 
 
 The simulation results shown in Figures 24 and 25 evaluate the composition as 
well as the throughput and delay performance of the AOI mechanism. It can be clearly 
seen that aggregation improves throughput across the full range of network load 
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Figure 25: Network Throughput 
 
The improvement in throughput with data aggregation in the AOI comes at a tradeoff of 
increased end-to-end delay as can be seen in Table 5. 
 





9.3 Multistage Network Security [24] 
 
We also proposed an efficient multistage security mechanism for node and data 
authentication and data confidentiality. Node authentication is provided by digital signa-
tures and the public key infrastructure (PKI). The TESLA algorithm and IPSec are util-
ized for data authentication and confidentiality, respectively. Performance analysis and 
simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism meets the real-time data dis-
semination requirements of a ballistic missile defense system while maintaining through-
put commensurate with unencrypted Internet Protocol (IP).  
  
 
9.4 Sensor Motes for Target Tracking 
 
We conducted a simple target tracking experiment using a network of Crossbow 
sensor motes. In the experiment, the onboard acoustic sensors (microphones) emulated 
the RF/IR sensors of a ballistic missile defense network. Each sensor node contained a 
transceiver operating at 2.4 GHz for communication and an acoustic sensor. The acoustic 
sensors used have a range of 2-3 feet, and their accuracy rapidly degrades as the distance 
between the sensor and the target increases. In the first step of the experiment, the sensi-
tivity and range of coverage of the acoustic sensors was determined. Followed by that, a 
network of nine of these sensor nodes was formed to conduct the tracking of a moving 
object through the sensor field. An object with an onboard acoustic source is then ma-
neuvered through the sensor field, and the measurements at each of the nine sensors are 
recorded. By combining the measurements, we found that the object’s location within the 
sensor field could be determined with an accuracy of 5% or greater. These are very pre-
liminary results and the techniques used to combine the measurements are simplistic. 
Nevertheless, this effort could be expanded to implement and test the algorithms devel-
oped and tested in Matlab for tracking and fusion.  
 
 
10     Missile Defense Technologies  
 
 This section will cover several technologies and methods being used or developed 
that can be employed in a BMDS. These technologies and methods provide a solution to 
tracking and intercepting a long range ballistic missile.  
 
 
10.1    Predicting Threat OTH Radar Footprints [25] 
  
MDA planners are preparing to defend the U.S., their outposts and those of our 
allies against theater and intercontinental ballistic missiles from industrialized foes. Over 
the Horizon (OTH) radar systems plays an important role in targeting these threat mis-
siles. China is enhancing its battlefield surveillance ability especially within the Taiwan 
Strait. The acquisition of modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
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systems remains a critical aspect of Beijing's military modernization. China is developing 
its ISR capabilities based upon indigenous developments, supplemented by foreign tech-
nology acquisition, and procurement of complete foreign systems. Its capabilities can be 
enhanced by new space systems, airborne early warning aircraft, long range unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and OTH radar. There are as many as three Chinese OTH sky-wave radar 
systems used to target aircraft carriers and provide an early warning capability. Also, 
there is at least one surface-wave OTH radar in mainland China. OTH radar enhances 
China’s ability to detect, monitor and target naval forces in the Western Pacific Ocean 
and the Taiwan Strait [26][27]. 
PROPLAB ray tracing simulation software was used to predict the path of the HF 
signal from a Chinese OTH radar system propagating in the ionosphere. The location 
chosen for simulation of the OTH radar system is Nanjing, China. The results from the 
simulations revealed the properties of reading OTH radar. Figure 26 shows the graph of 
one of our experiments. It shows the ray tracing using only one hop and we can observe 
that the skip distance is about 1320 km which is also where the distance changes direc-
tion (from decreasing to increasing) at the angle of 28 degrees.  
 
 
Figure 26: One-hop ray tracing with different degrees 
 
 
10.2    Electronic Warfare Metrics 
 
The technical concept of this work is to continue the development of our network-
centric EW metric simulation to assess the value of information and networking when 
active RF sensors and communication links are used to support the MDA Advance Battle 
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Manager. The simulation (using MATLAB) provides a comprehensive analysis of net-
work capabilities, and includes the different wireless technologies and topologies used for 
electronic warfare [28][29][30]. This project will also include a detailed model to predict 
the important network EW metrics such as connectivity measure, reference connectivity 
measure, network reach, and network richness. Also quantified will be the characteristic 
tempo of various network connections and the impact on the command and control. The 
simulation will use the EW metrics to quantify the operational tempo of the OODA (ob-
serve, orient, decide, act) loop during a ballistic missile launch. 
 When analyzing a network approach to EW, the typical approach is usually to as-
sume that there are a large (asymptotic) number of nodes that are homogeneous and the 
network does not evolve in time during combat. The role of information in combat how-
ever, is nonlinear and a complex problem [31]. The new capability of our proposed 
simulation approach is that it quantifies the network centric electronic warfare metrics for 
any multi-faceted EW problem involving technology, organization structure, command 
and control and human factors (such as cognition and decision making).  
The metrics that are quantified with our simulation will capture the degree of 
networking, the network topology and communication modes. It will also quantify the 
level of shared awareness and the quality of decisions that are made using the information 
provided by the network. Since the capability value of each node is separately modeled, 
the re-routing option impact can be easily examined. In addition, the performance of a 
real network under electronic attack can be analyzed easily.  
The rate of change as a function of the number of links that are cut, nodes being 
degraded (or attacked) provide insight into the network robustness. Another novel aspect 
of our simulation is quantifying the richness of the network which is a measure of the av-
erage rate that information entropy (or knowledge) is generated through the network. 
With the network richness and network reach, the characteristic tempo can be quantified. 
The characteristic tempo reflects the network’s finite maximum rate of information ex-
change which is limited by the technologies employed and the network topology. The 
speed of the C2 and the action tempos involved will also be incorporated in the simula-
tion to quantify the operational tempo of the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop. In 
summary, with this simulation we are able to realistically assess the effectiveness of EW 
employment for any general type of network scenario. 
  
 
11 Attack Laser ABM 
 
The Air Force YAL-1A Attack Laser, a.k.a. Airborne Laser (ABL), is a compo-
nent of the BMDS.  The fundamental objective of the BMDS is to develop the capability 
to defend United States forces, territories and allies against all classes of ballistic missile 
threats. The BMDS suite will include other complementary missile interceptors, land, air, 
sea and space-based sensors, and battle management command and control systems.  The 
MDA will develop, test, and continuously evaluates operational alternatives for “hit-to-
kill” technology, which the agency describes as “hitting a bullet with a bullet” [32]. 
MDA is developing BMDS technology for engaging missiles in three phases of 
launch – the boost phase, the midcourse phase, and the terminal phase. The boost phase is 
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the phase in which the missile’s warhead is still attached to the booster rockets.  In this 
phase, the missile is more vulnerable to counterattack because of the fuel it contains.  
Countering missiles in this phase is also ideal because it results in the missile falling to 
the ground nearer the adversary’s territory.  The ABL is one system that the MDA is 
fielding to counter ballistic missiles in the boost phase. The ABL mission is to find, track, 
engage and destroy small, short-range surface-launched missiles while they are still in the 
highly vulnerable boost phase of flight.  Operating above the tropopause, the system will 
autonomously detect and track missiles as they are launched, using an onboard surveil-
lance system.  The system will acquire the target, then accurately point and fire a directed 
energy laser to sufficiently weaken the missile casing during flight to cause structural 
failure.  The directed energy laser has a revolutionary adaptive optical system capable of 
focusing extreme heat onto a basketball-sized spot from hundreds of miles away.  The 
ABL can also transfer information on launch sites, targeting, tracking and predicted im-
pact point information to other components of the BMDS. 
The ABL’s megawatt-class kill laser is one of the oldest technologies on the ABL 
platform.  It was developed by the Air Force in the 1970s, the laser functions by a chemi-
cal reaction between chlorine, hydrogen peroxide and iodine to create an explosion of 
light.  This light travels down a mirrored tube and flexible hose to the rotating nose turret.  
The ABL is expected to be able to fire 20 to 40 kill shots before requiring landing for 
maintenance.  In addition to missile defense, the ABL will have inherent capabilities to 
perform other activities, such as engaging threat aircraft, temporarily blinding enemy sat-
ellites, performing imaging surveillance and providing cruise missile defense.  
To date, all components of the ABL have been successfully tested individually, 
and the MDA is currently conducting series of tests with the components integrated as a 
complete system.  When complete, the ABL will meet an urgent requirement that has 
been around since DESERT STORM, since Iraqi Scuds were used to bomb buildings and 
kill our troops.  This capability has been in development by the Air Force since 1993, but 
long before then, extensive developments occurred that set the stage for today’s ABL 
project. 
The ABL successfully demonstrated its laser targeting system against an airborne 
target for the first time in March 2007 [33].  The target was a white, missile-shaped 
silhouette painted onto an NC-135E.  After taking off from Edwards Air Force Base, 
California, the ABL aircraft used its infrared sensors to find the simulated missile ex-
haust, then pointed and fired its tracking laser at the target, and successfully calculate the 
range to the target [34]. The ABL’s beacon laser also collected data on atmospheric 
turbulence.  The ABL program will install the kill laser in the aircraft in 2007, and is 
scheduled to conduct its first airborne missile intercept test in late 2009 [35]. 
The ABL uses six strategically placed infrared sensors to detect the exhaust trail 
of a missile.  Once a target is detected, the ABL’s automated beam control process kicks 
in.  Next, a kilowatt laser tracks the missile and determines a precise aim point.  Another 
kilowatt-class laser then measures atmospheric disturbance, which is then corrected by 
the adaptive optics system.  This information is used to accurately point and focus the 
high-energy kill laser at the target [36].  Lastly, using a very large telescope located in the 
nose turret, the beam control system focuses the megawatt kill laser onto a pressurized 
area of the boosting missile until the directed energy causes the missile structure to fail. 
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The ABL has at least three known limitations, referred to as the Near Neighbor, 
Moving Target and Near the Edge failure modes.  Near Neighbor failure could occur if 
multiple missiles are launched from within the ABL’s coverage area.  This could cause 
confusion for the ABL in determining which missile to target.  Moving Target failure 
could occur if the ABL has begun engaging the target missile and an object (decoy mis-
sile, enemy fighter, etc.) passes between the ABL and the missile target.  This could 
cause the ABL to lose focus on the target missile and track the passing object.  Near the 
Edge failure could occur if the ABL gets a late track on the target missile, which would 
cause a lag in tracking.  The missile would be ahead of or outside of the ABL’s tracking 
field of view.   
Despite these failure modes, the ABL still promises to be a defensive force to be 
reckoned with.  Where the ABL falls short, other components of the boost phase BMDS 
fill the void.  These components include the Airborne Tactical Laser, which is a smaller, 





 This section highlights the major results of our work in FY07 and discusses 
followon research to extend these results in FY08. 
 
 
12.1 High-Assurance Requirements Specification, Validation and 
Verification Techniques 
 
The research presented in Sections 3 and 4 brings together the Statechart-
Assertion and MSC-Assertion formalisms, run-time monitoring, discrete event simula-
tions, and JUnit based test methodology to support a scenario-based, iterative process for 
specifying, validating, and verifying complex temporal requirements of distributed reac-
tive systems. The Statechart-Assertions and MSC-Assertions are similar to the intuitive 
and familiar UML MSCs, making them easier to use and understand than text-based tem-
poral assertions of the kind found in literature such as Linear-time Temporal Logic 
(LTL). Various formal verification techniques suggested in the literature approach the 
correctness of Web Services temporal behaviors by expressing these temporal properties 
as LTL statements and subsequent model checking. Most model checkers, like SPIN, do 
not support specifications with real-life constraints such as real-time and time-series. 
Moreover, LTL has a rather weak expressive power (LTL is sub-regular). In contrast, 
MSC Assertions use Java/C++ as an underlying language and therefore enjoy Turing-
equivalent descriptive power. The scenario-based, iterative process help ensure the cor-
rectness of formal requirements per the modeler’s expectations early in the development 
process, and the use of discrete event simulation in tandem with automatic, JUnit-based, 
white-box testing and run-time verification to verify the temporal behavior for distributed 
system prototypes.  
One of the challenges in assembling Service Oriented Architecture based BMDS 
is that the safety of a system can only be evaluated within the context of the system and 
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its operational environment, whereas the various service providers are often developed 
without consideration of the target system context. Section 2 describes the use of safety-
wrappers and safety executives to help safeguard the operation of reusable components 
that are oblivious of the system context. Safety wrappers monitor the behavior of the re-
usable components within the system context, and safety executives help reduce the 
probability of occurrence of mishaps by providing a centralized point for safety process-
ing: the detection, tolerance and isolation of faults that may result in safety hazards. 
We plan to continue our work on MSC-Assertions and run-time execution moni-
toring to provide new means for engineers to specify time- and safety-critical behaviors 
in SOA-based SoSes as web services contracts, and develop tools to generate executable 
code from these contracts for use in service provider selection, integration test automa-
tion, and run-time monitors to ensure that the services do behavior correctly and safely in 
its new environment. 
 
 
12.2 Run-time Network Security Monitoring 
 
One of the many facets of missile defense network security is the availability of 
event traces for ongoing network forensic analysis. Instead of logging every events in the 
missile defense network, we need automation to monitor the network and only log inter-
esting (or suspicious) event sequences.  We plan to investigate the use of MSC-
Assertions to specify interesting behavior of event sequences and run-time execution 




12.3 Real-Time Java System Evaluation 
 
Section 5 described the results of our experiments with the SUN Java RTS 2.0 
beta release that includes the real-time garbage collector. The experiments confirmed the 
viability of our proposed design pattern for the GIFC that allows developers to use (and 
re-use) Java code libraries and components that use the heap in the time-constrained ap-
plications. We plan to extend our study to the IBM WebSphere real-time Java system and 
compare the performances between these systems. 
 
 
12.4 Data Fusion 
 
Data Fusion, the topic of section 6, showed a method of evaluating the perform-
ance of multiple radars. By calculating and assigning a score to each sensor track the op-
timum guide for the interceptor of the threat could be found. The implementation of dif-
ferent types of radar in the vicinity of the missile launch site can be an issue for further 
investigation. Radars with different parameters, such as transmitted power, frequency, 
PRF, antenna gain and antenna temperature based on actual sky temperatures for the ra-
dar frequency and beam elevation angles of interest will present a more realistic scenario 
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for the data fusion problem. In this situation, the distance between the sensor and the tar-
get is not the primary factor for evaluating the data fusion problem. The data fusion 
problem for the IR sensors based on the likelihood ratio can be studied in a future re-
search. The fusion of the IR sensor data in boost phase is not the primary goal as the 
function of IR is only to detect the ballistic missile. In the next stages is where the IR 
sensor can contribute to the tracking of the missile hence the data fusion problem. A 
study involving deployment of multiple simultaneously launched ballistic missiles is of 
interest. A network of LEO satellites with IR sensors may be employed to discriminate 
targets and determine the tracks of multiple targets. 
 
 
12.5 Ballistic Missile Tracking 
 
The first experiments of Section 7 concluded that the IMM tracking proved supe-
rior to Kalman Filter Tracking in the transition from the boost to coast phase of the mis-
sile. The later experiments on the Kalman Backfit demonstrated a bias with large uncer-
tainties when determining the missile launch site. The Hyperbolic Backfit gave a rea-
sonably fast and superior result to the Kalman Backfit as well as the Evolutionary Pro-
gramming and Particle filter backfit. Section 8 discussed appropriateness of the Multiple 
Hypothesis Tracking to the application ballistic missile tracking. The likeness of the mis-
sile data as compared to real-world threat platforms helped to demonstrate the feasibility 
of the MHT’s application. The results show that a technique called linear assignment 
problem (LAP) used in the implementation of the algorithm is successful in an environ-
ment where complex interactions of missile staging, non-linear thrust profiles and sensor 
noise can significantly degrade the algorithm’s performance, especially in multiple target 
scenarios. Determining the N-best associations and each respective probability was bene-
ficial as it offered a means to expediently identify correct target-to-next-measurement 
pairings within each scan. The linear assignment approach avoided propagating infeasible 
hypotheses to later scans and reduced the computational complexity. 
Our tracking research this past year has demonstrated that the IMM tracker is ca-
pable of producing high-fidelity tracks during boost phase and in the transition from 
boost to coast phases of a ballistic missile flight trajectory using range and bearing meas-
urements.  There are three lines of research arising from our work this year that we wish 
to pursue.  
First, we would like to extend the measurement model to include measurements 
from alternative sensors, some including Doppler measurements and some with bearing-
only measurements, assessing the effect on track error for different sensor suites.  A re-
lated problem concerning errors generated by preprocessing range-bearing measurements 
in long range radar data and EKF tracking algorithms bears investigation for the potential 
effects on tracking errors especially during midcourse. 
Second, we would like to use our track estimates to determine the likely target site 
in order to cue assets that can be used downstream (midcourse attack or terminal de-
fense).  Hence, reasonable estimates of both launch point determination and target deter-
mination should be generated rapidly for real-time cueing of quick response attacking and 
defending assets. 
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Finally, we wish to study the synergism between interceptor guidance and track-
ing estimation errors to learn not only what guidance algorithms are likely to give the 
best performance for boost-phase intercept, but also what algorithms and launch strate-
gies can best tolerate tracking and prediction errors, both prior to launch and during mid-
course update of the interceptor. 
 
12.6 Sensor Networks 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), consisting of nodes with sensing, computa-
tional and wireless communications capabilities, can be applied to target detection and 
tracking, surveillance, monitoring and inventory management. During the past year, we  
proposed a hybrid, large-scale wireless sensor network (WSN) to support real-time target 
detection and tracking of multiple ballistic missile threats of all ranges and in all phases 
of flight. 
 The data dissemination and real-time tracking require optimization of the net-
work data throughput and end-to-end time-delay. The Area of Interest (AOI) clustering 
mechanism is introduced, which combines the “content based” feature of the data centric 
routing approach with the principles of in-network data aggregation and clustering. 
Building upon this AOI mechanism, a data dissemination algorithm suitable for a hybrid 
large-scale WSN, designed to meet the real-time and accuracy operational requirements 
imposed by the nature and mission of the WSN without introducing excessive data over-
head and increased time-delays is presented. Medium access control (MAC) schemes are 
investigated since the nature of the proposed WSN necessitates for a shared medium con-
sideration, rather than treating the node interconnections as dedicated point-to-point 
communication links. A contention based scheme, Carrier Sense Multiple Access 
(CSMA) MAC, and a contention free approach, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) 
MAC, are examined.  
In the previous work, a two-color (MWIR-VLWIR) QWIP FPA sensor was con-
sidered. Further investigation into an IR detector with multi-color capabilities of more 
than two-colors, involving FPAs of larger and different format is proposed. Such a devel-
opment would cover almost all the IR sensor requirements of a BDMS. Moreover, the 
examination of modern detector materials such as the Sb-based strained-layer superlattice 
(type-II SLS) photodetectors is highly recommended since they combine the advantages 
of both HgCdTe (high quantum efficiency) and QWIP (high uniformity). Additionally, 
we only addressed the RF sensors briefly. We propose to evaluate specific RF sensors in 
a hybrid WSN environment in terms of their capabilities for target detection / tracking, 
kill-assessment as well as background and countermeasure discrimination throughout the 
trajectory of the ICBM. 
The data dissemination mechanism investigated modeled the traffic flow from the 
sensor nodes to the sink (command and control center), assuming that the AOI clustering 
mechanism had a limited number of sensor members, a low degree of in-network data 
aggregation was performed within the AOI, and the target trajectory was in bound toward 
the sink. Future work may consider modeling multiple traffic flows including weapon 
assignment flows, expanding the AOI to include more sensors, performing a higher de-
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gree of in-network data aggregation involving data fusion techniques and examining the 
case of multiple sinks.  
The performance of the proposed network security mechanism was demonstrated 
using sequential processing of the associated cryptographic functions and addressed only 
authentication and confidentiality issues. Future work will include a complete imple-
mentation and subsequently fielding of the security mechanism proposed. As part of this 
follow-on work, the analysis of the TESLA algorithm will be expanded. Additional im-
provements to the performance of the security mechanism, including parallel processing 
and data aggregation within the AOI, may be investigated. A complete security solution 
would also address other security challenges, such as defending against denial of service 
(DoS) and other types of attacks, detecting misbehaving or rogue nodes, preventing traf-
fic analysis, and optimizing key management techniques.  
 
12.7 Simulation of Electronic Warfare Metrics 
 
 In this work we will complete the investigation to characterize the duality or rela-
tionship between the network-centric parameters and the warfare performance in the bat-
tlespace. For example, the number of nodes (in network space) relates to the situational 
awareness (in the battlespace) and the number of connections (in network space) relate to 
the agility (in the battlespace). We will also complete the simulation to quantify the met-
rics given above and include (for any number of EW nodes), the time dependent network 
evolution. Questions to be answered include: how can time dependence be included in the 
simulation to model the flow component which is scaled by the route length? How can 
time dependence be included in the node capability value? How can coordinated and 
scripted interactions be quantified and compared using the network metrics.  
By using the source rate and observation of the OODA tempo in the analysis of 
the network robustness insight into the action tempos can be realized. Question to be an-
swered include: What are the necessary action tempos that must be included in the 
OODA cycle speed analysis? What action tempos correspond to realistic scenario situa-
tions such as flight time, speed of force deployment, jammer ON time etc? 
When a network centric approach to EW is used, many questions can not be an-
swered in a straightforward formulation. Questions such as how the different degrees of 
networking impact the strategic, operational and tactical outcomes must be known in or-
der that an optimal network topology can be formed (physical, virtual arrangement of 
elements). How the network topology will impact the C2 is also of interest since this af-
fects the correct balance of sensors, shooters and network technology. Of utmost impor-
tance is the network assurance and how we can quantify the ability of the network to 
sustain degradation. These issues must be measured in order to improve the understand-
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14 List of Acronyms 
 
1) ABL – Airborne Laser 
 
2) AOI – Area of Interest 
 
3) BMDS – Ballistic Missile Defense System 
 
4) BPEL – Business Processing Execution Language 
 
5) C2BMC – Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications 
 
6) CR-MAC – Cooperative Radar Medium Access Control 
 
7) CSMA – Carrier Sense Multiple Access 
 
8) DoS – Denial of Service 
 
9) EKF – Extended Kalman Filter 
 
10) EW – Electronic Warfare 
 
11) FMECA – Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
 
12) GEO – Geostationary Earth Orbit  
 
13) GIFC – Global Integrated Fire Control System 
 
14) HF – High-Frequency 
 
15) IMM – Interactive Multiple Model 
 
16) KEI – Kinetic Energy Interceptors 
 
17) KF – Kalman Filter 
 
18) ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
 
19) LAP – Linear Assignment Problem 
 
20) LEO – Low Earth Orbit 
 
21) LIDAR – Light Detection and Ranging 
 
22) LPRF – Low Pulse Repetition Frequency 
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23) LTL – Linear-time Temporal Logic 
 
24) MAC – Medium Control Access 
 
25) MDA – Missile Defense Agency 
 
26) MDNT – Missile Defense National Team 
 
27) MEADS – Medium Extended Air Defense System 
 
28) MHT – Multiple Hypothesis Tracking 
 
29) MSC- Message Sequence Chart 
 
30) NCS – Nagarajan, Chidambara, and Sharma 
 
31) OMNeT++ – Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++ 
 
32) OODA – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act  
 
33) OTH – Over the Horizon 
 
34) PHA  – Preliminary Hazard Analyses 
 
35) PRF – Pulse Repetition Frequency 
 
36) REM – Runtime Execution Monitoring 
 
37) RF – Radio Frequency 
 
38) RTGC – Real-Time Garbage Collector 
 
39) RTS – (Sun Java) Real-Time System 
 
40) SNR –  Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
 
41) SOA – Service-Oriented Architecture 
 
42) SoS –  System-of-Systems 
 
43) SoSes – Systems-of-Systems 
 
44) SRTM – Safety Requirements Traceability Matrix 
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45) SSRTM – Software Safety Requirements Traceability Matrix 
 
46) TDMA – Time Division Medium Access 
 
47) THAAD – Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
 
48) UAV – Unmanned Air Vehicles 
 
49) UML – Unified Modeling Language 
 
50) UML-RT – Unified modeling Language for Real Time 
 
51) WBATG – White-Box Automatic Test Generator 
 
52) WS – Web Services 
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